Approved For Release 200 P. : C. ROPR 10975A094900170001-9 NOCUMENT HO. 25X1 22 January 1960 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ONEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010 AUTH: HR 78-2 Copy No. C DATE . 6 JUN 1980 REVIEWERS ITELLIGEI BULLETI DIA review(s) completed.

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TOP SECRET

25X1 Algeria-France: [Long-smoldering hostility toward De Gaulle has intensified among rightist Europeans in Algeria recently. Settler unrest has been increased by rumors that new overtures to the Algerian rebels will follow a governmen-

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### III. THE WEST

tal conference on Algeria in Paris, scheduled for 22 January.7

Cuba: Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro has announced a comprehensive reorganization of his ministry. This is a move to strengthen the disorganized military forces as well as to bring their training more fully in line with "revolutionary thinking." Most of the new departments are headed by cronies of Raul's who formerly held similar posts in the army only. Che Guevara, the pro-Communist head of the National Bank of Cuba, is listed as being the head of the "Instruction" Department.

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Venezuela: /The Venezuelan Government, which faces a continuing drain in liquid foreign exchange reserves, has suffered a recent decline in its short-term cash position. After borrowing about \$95,000,000 from oil interests last fall, the government now intends to seek a loan of about \$200,000,000 from private US banks to meet a deficit in its \$1,800,000,000 budget for 1960. Recourse to foreign borrowing, always unpopular in Venezuela, probably is contemplated only because of the regime's concern over the possible political consequences of

other solutions for the economic crisis such as cutting back the

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## IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Estimate of the World Situation. NIE 100-60. 19 Jan 1960.

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public works program.

DAILY BRIEF

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# I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

| Kremlin Concerned Over Military Reaction to Troop Cut                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 25X <sup>2</sup> |
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| Premier Khrushchev is reported to have said in conversation that the principle of reducing Soviet armed forces 'had not been easy to sell' to the military. There are also indications that the regime is still concerned over possible continuing adverse reaction.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | <b>25</b> ×1     |
| In an unusual move by the Kremlin, five top party leaders—Averky Aristov, Nikolay Ignatov, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, Mikhail Suslov, and Petr Pospelov—attended a special meeting of the officers of the Moscow Garrison on 19 January to explain the regime's plans for easing the transition to civilian life of the men and officers who will lose their military jobs in the troop reduction scheduled to take place in the next two years. Similar meetings in the past have been held subsequent to events which had a special impact on the military—the ouster of Beria in July 1953 and of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov in July 1957, and the firing of Marshal Zhukov in November 1957. |                  |
| The recent Moscow Garrison meeting is indicative of the regime's concern over the morale of the officer corps but it also suggests that the regime is firm in its decision to reduce the Soviet armed forces by more than a million men, including 250,000 officers. Defense Minister Malinovsky, who gave the main speech, elaborated the privileges to be granted the discharged servicemen. Officers, for example, who had no civilian profession are to draw full military pay for a year while learning new skills and are guaranteed housing within three months. Party presidium member Suslov gave a "long" speech but its contents have not been disclosed.                               |                  |
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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

## Ethiopia to Accept Soviet Petroleum Products

Addis Ababa reportedly has accepted a Soviet offer to supply--on liberal terms and at reduced price--refined petroleum products approximating a nine-month supply for Ethiopia. Four Western petroleum firms--at present the sole distributors of petroleum products in Ethiopia--were told on 19 January to indicate by 25 January whether they would distribute petroleum products "given" Ethiopia by a "friendly country." Addis Ababa made it clear that if they refused, the USSR would develop the necessary facilities.

The oil deal, probably the first agreement negotiated under terms of the \$100,000,000 credit granted to Emperor Haile Selassie in Moscow last summer--very likely stems from Ethiopia's serious financial situation and the Emperor's desire to conserve foreign exchange for an extensive economic development program. The State Bank of Ethiopia recently introduced restrictions on both imports and domestic credit in an effort to check the outflow of foreign exchange. Since early November, Soviet economic experts and Ethiopian officials have been seeking appro-

priate projects to utilize the credit.

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# Afghan-Soviet Agreements for Dam Construction Announced

| One and possibly two new construction agreements have               |
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| been signed for dam and hydroelectric power projects to be          |
| built with Soviet assistance in Afghanistan under the 1956 So-      |
| viet \$100,000,000 loan. Moscow announced on 21 January that        |
| Naghlu hydroelectric dam near Kabul will be completed in five       |
| years. In addition, an agreement was signed on 19 January,          |
| covering the Jalalabad irrigation and hydroelectric dam proj-       |
| ect west of the Khyber Pass, according to a Reuters report          |
| from Kabul. Preliminary surveys for these projects were             |
| completed in 1957. Although the Afghan Government had ap-           |
| parently decided by 1958 to construct both of these projects,       |
| engineering problems and the lack of local currency to cover        |
| Afghan costs have delayed the signing of construction con-          |
| tracts. Construction agreements for the two projects will           |
| probably obligate about a third of the \$100,000,000 Soviet credit. |
|                                                                     |

Kabul may use these announcements to demonstrate to the Pakistani Government that Pakistani President Ayub's recent objections to Soviet activity in Afghanistan have not moved the Afghans to change their readiness to accept Soviet aid. If construction work begins on the dam near the Khyber in the near future, the introduction of a large number of Soviet technicians into this area, which lies adjacent to the sensitive tribal territory along the Afghan-Pakistani border, would prob-

ably be viewed as a pointed rebuff by Rawalpindi.

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Increasing Settler Unrest in Algeria

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Long-smoldering hostility toward De Gaulle among rightist Europeans in Algeria appears to have intensified. Although the close alliance of May 1958 between settlers and the army which brought about the downfall of the Fourth Republic has yet to be re-established, there are indications that the settlers are openly seeking army support for a "trial of strength" with De Gaulle.

Settler unrest has been fanned by an increase in rebel terrorism in the Algiers Department, uncertainty concerning the significance of an Algerian rebel council of war in Tripoli, and the furor surrounding the recall to Paris of the outspoken General Massu. A cabinet statement of 20 January reiterating support for De Gaulle's Algerian policy, and the scheduling of a conference of top civil and military officials concerned with Algeria for 22 January in Paris, have added to the tension. Extremists in Algeria fear that the conference may be followed by new overtures to the rebels.

One settler leader has alleged that as many as 15,000 right-ist militants, organized into three groups, are prepared "to act in a moment" should De Gaulle continue to support a policy of Algerian self-determination, and that the rightists will not be misled by any temporary hardening of Paris' attitude toward the rebels if it is not accompanied by a change in policy. Europeans in Algeria are believed to be well supplied with small arms, some of which have been distributed by the army for purposes of local security.

Although senior French officials in Algeria are believed loyal to De Gaulle, there are indications that several, particularly among the military, have expressed sympathy with the goal of a "French Algeria" in such a manner as to encourage extremist elements. Meanwhile, the Algerian rebels probably view the growing opposition to De Gaulle as evidence that De Gaulle's personal assurances of eventual self-determination may not be sufficiently binding on France to justify cease-fire talks.

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### III. THE WEST

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### Venezuelan Government Faces Serious Financial Problems

The Venezuelan Government is faced with a 50-percent decline in its short-term cash position and a continuing drop in liquid foreign exchange reserves—a situation which could touch off renewed political opposition and a division within the ruling three-party coalition. After borrowing about \$95,000,000 from the oil interests last fall to check the rapid loss of exchange, the government now intends to seek a loan of \$200,000,000 from private US banks to meet a deficit in its \$1,800,000,000 budget for 1960.7

Minister of Finance Mayobre has stated that President Betancourt, the cabinet, and the coalition parties agree that foreign borrowing is the only solution to the urgent problem. He also indicated that further attempts to cut the public works program—like those which gave rise to serious rioting in Caracas on 11 January and last August—are not considered feasible because of the dangers of unemployment and concomitant political unrest.

Recourse to a foreign loan, which is highly unpopular in Venezuela and was opposed last year by President Betancourt, suggests the regime's concern over the political consequences of further economic deterioration. Dissident civilian and military elements will be encouraged to use the economic problems to foment opposition to the government, which is handicapped by internal dissension. On 19 January the leader of the Democratic Republican Union party, a dissatisfied component of the coalition, pointed out the tension among the three parties and called for a government reorganization.

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#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

